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This article discusses methodological and philosophical issues linked to action research. The
concepts of subjectivity and objectivity—potential sources of bias that mislead researchers
in dealing with these concepts—and how to cope with them are discussed. Controversial
issues of truth in positivism, postpositivism, and other schools of philosophy are
considered. Finally, the article touches on validity criteria, validity types, and how to
grapple with validity in action research.
Cet article porte sur des enjeux méthodologiques et philosophiques liés à la
recherche-action. On y discute les concepts de subjectivité et d’objectivité, sources
potentielles de préjugés qui ont induit en erreur les chercheurs, et la façon de leur faire
front. Des questions controversées touchant la vérité dans le positivisme, le postpositivisme
et d’autres écoles de philosophie sont également étudiées. Finalement, l’article évoque les
critères de validité, les types de validité et la façon d’aborder la validité en recherche-action.
Introduction
In recent years there has been increasing acceptance of action research among
teachers. It might be counted as a shift from academic research to more ac-
tionable research by teachers. As Holly, Arhar, and Kasten (2005) describe,
action research tends to move “from research on teachers to research on the
company of teachers, to research with teachers, [and] finally to research by
teachers, with teachers, students, and others” (p. 14). Perhaps teachers have
come to realize that academic research has failed to meet their needs in class-
room situations because its orientation has been to produce papers and books,
but in Lewin’s (1988) words, “research that produces nothing but books will
not suffice” (p. 41). What is action research, and what is about it that has caused
such a turn? According to Kemmis (1988), “action research consisted in analy-
sis, fact-finding, conceptualization, planning, execution, more fact-finding, or
evaluation; and then a repetition of this whole circle of activities; indeed a
spiral of such circles” (p. 29). Action researchers aim to improve what is
happening in the workplace in which they are involved as action research
essentially means “research that affects action” (Corey, 1988, p. 63). It is
through such a process that teachers develop their pedagogical knowledge as
well as that of subject matter.
Teachers recognize action research as a means of professional development
and a useful approach for generating actionable knowledge pertinent to their
own field of activity and changing the educational setting for the better (Fried-
man, Razer, & Sykes, 2004). Using action research, teachers try to understand
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various phenomena, particularly the ongoing dynamics of human interactions
in their educational environment. Unlike traditional academic research that
intends to declare uniform, overarching, or scientific rules, in action research,
rules are more or less constructed as a result of teacher-student interactions.
They “negotiate what counts as knowledge in the classroom, who can have
knowledge, and how knowledge can be generated, challenged and evaluated”
(Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 1993, p. 45). During this process researchers are in-
volved such that they evaluate their own work. Considering such a critical
evaluative process, the researcher must know how valid the data are and how
to persuade the audiences that the research findings are worthwhile. In this
regard the notion of validity in action research is of critical importance. In order
to see how valid the results are, teachers must consider how close their findings
are to truth, and truth in part is in close relationship with objectivity and
subjectivity. In what follows the concept of bias, its potential sources, condens-
ing methods, and how it could affect subjectivity and objectivity are discussed.
Then these concepts are sought as the derivatives of truth theories, validity and
its criteria, and the methodological concerns of action research method.
Objectivity and Subjectivity
Subjectivity means “a way of knowing which is located in a person’s own
perspective, including experiences and expectations as well as ‘here and now’
perceptions,” whereas objectivity is understood as “a way of knowing which is
not specifically located and in this way can see the entirety of any situation”
(Ladkin, 2005, p. 110). A claim to truth from objective knowing implies that it
states a truth that is valid from any perspective.
Objectivity and subjectivity have roots in two distinct schools of thought
about the truth. One of these believes that reality is out there distinct from our
interpretations and can be fully captured—the positivists’ tenet. At the other
extreme is an ideology that unveils the world as a series of phenomena in the
minds of human beings who interpret them in as many ways as their charac-
teristics: the ideology supported by poststructuralists. Although the latter
denies the existence of the truth and objectivity, positivists believe that the
more researchers are objective, the closer they are to the truth. Whether re-
searchers believe in positivism or poststructuralism, a level of objectivity is
desired. However, some barriers make this difficult. Researcher bias is one that
is in part tied to the researcher’s role, and a characteristic of action research is
the appreciation of the part the researcher plays in the inquiry. So when such a
characteristic comes to existence, bias is there.
Action research, like any other kinds of research, is a human activity subject
to the same kind of failings as other human activities. One might make mis-
takes and get things wrong. There is no paradigm solution for the elimination
of error and bias. Various forms of research may be inclined to varied sources
of error, but clearly none is immune (Elliott, 1990). Although there are method-
ological strategies for handling validity, less consideration has been given to
researcher bias and to the personal and social strategies needed to address it.
Much bias comes from data collection and the interpretation process. Be-
cause every researcher starts doing research with an idea in mind, he or she
looks at events from a specific perspective that might be based in a particular
theory. So the researcher’s observation would be to some extent theory-laden.
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It is somewhat easier to control the biasing effects of prior knowledge and
beliefs when one is observing inanimate nature than when one is observing
human or social phenomena (Phillips, 1987). For we are human, and our beliefs
about mankind are strongly held, and are connected with our feelings and
evaluations. Such feelings and evaluations lead the researcher toward findings
that might be biased. Norris (1997) explains a range of potential sources of bias
in research as follows.
1. the reactivity of researchers with the providers and consumers of
information;
2. selection biases including the sampling of times, places, events, people,
issues, questions and the balance between the dramatic and the mundane;
3. the availability and reliability of various sources or kinds of data, either in
general or their availability to different researchers;
4. the affinity of researchers with certain kinds of people, designs, data,
theories, concepts, explanations;
5. the ability of researchers, including their knowledge, skills,
methodological strengths, capacity for imagination;
6.  the value preferences and commitments of researchers and their
knowledge or otherwise of these;
7. the personal qualities of researchers, including, for example, their capacity
for concentration and patience; tolerance of boredom and ambiguity; their
need for resolution, conclusion and certainty. (p. 174)
The researcher must be aware of such sources of bias and try to reduce
them. One of the strategies used to understand researcher bias is called
reflexivity, which means that the researcher “actively engages in critical self
reflection about his or her potential biases and predispositions” (Johnson, 1997,
p. 12). Through reflexivity, researchers become more self-aware and monitor
and attempt to control their biases.
Norris (1997) believes that detachment is another way by which the re-
searcher can reduce bias. According to Norris, to remain open-minded, alert to
foreclosure and to sources of error needs some measure of detachment. Re-
search requires detachment from oneself, a willingness to look at the self and
how it influences the quality of data and reports; in particular “research de-
mands a capacity to accept and use criticism, and to be self-critical in a con-
structive manner” (p. 173).
Hüsserl (1970) and Heidegger (1962) were also concerned about having as
much objective perception as possible while doing research. Both were con-
cerned about how it might be possible to arrive at a pre-interpreted apprehen-
sion of reality in order that the things to which our consciousness is directed
might speak for themselves. Hüsserl suggested how to do this through a
process he called eidetic reduction (Sokolowski, 2000), which leads the inquirer
to an understanding of the essence of what the researcher was inquiring.
Eidetic reduction is a “method by which the philosopher moves from the
consciousness of individual and concrete objects to the transempirical realm of
pure essences and thus achieves an intuition of the eidos (Greek: shape) of a
thing” (Encyclopedia Britannica online). This reduction technique involves
describing a thing as clearly as possible. Through repeated interactions of this
process and by releasing those qualifiers that do not speak to a fundamental
aspect of the thing, its essence would be revealed.
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Hüsserl (1970) and Heidegger (1962) tried to find a way of knowing phe-
nomena as they are without any recourse to interpretation. This was the aim of
Hüsserl’s process of eidetic reduction. An aspect of this method to reach
beyond subjectivity is bracketing. Bracketing refers to the phenomenological
goal of putting aside one’s preconceptions or expectations in order to en-
counter the essence of a phenomenon. Sokolowski (2000) elaborates on how
this is done.
We suspend our beliefs, and we bracket the world and all the things in the
world … When we so bracket the world or some particular object, we do not
turn it into a mere appearance, an illusion, a mere idea, or any other sort of
merely subjective impression. Rather, we now consider it precisely as it is
intended by an intentionality … We consider it as correlated with whatever
intentionality targets it. If it is a perceived object, we examine it as perceived; if
it is a remembered object, we examine it as remembered; if it is a mathematical
entity we consider it as correlated with a mathematical intention … Bracketing
retains exactly the modality and the mode of manifestation that the object has
for the subject. (pp. 49-50)
Habermas (1984) proposes another way to be more objective. Proposing the
Theory of Communicative Action (TCA), Habermas implies that dialog is a
powerful tool to understand meaning. Dissatisfied with the interpretive under-
standing of language, Habermas’ pragmatism recovers the agency of the sub-
ject so that language becomes a means that the subject uses to coordinate
actions and to mediate how people experience reality. In this context, dialog
becomes a powerful means for people to learn from one another and about the
objective world (Beck, 1992). One of the most important premises of TCA is
that any subject has a universal capacity for language and action, making it
possible for any subject to participate in intersubjective unrestricted dialogs.
Furthermore, the recognition of the universal communicative capacity to un-
derstand and generate new knowledge leads to the demonopolization of scien-
tific version of knowledge.
According to Habermas (1984), the scientific explanation cannot be based
only on the subjectivity of the expert or the researcher who is considered
objective; it should also be based on the intersubjectivity resulting from the
dialog among the participants and the researchers. In this way each person
brings his or her thoughts to the table. It is through the intersubjective process
of knowledge sharing that objectivity is guaranteed. This is why Habermas
believes that the epistemic authority transfers from the private understanding
of a subject to the public practices of a linguistic community (Sorde-Marti,
2004).
Heidegger (1962) looks at the issue through the engagement lens. He stres-
ses the importance of active engagement with things as a means by which
knowing occurs. Heidegger makes the distinction between types of engage-
ment in his terms “presence-to-hand” and “readiness-to-hand.” Engaging with
something in a present-to-hand way is to observe it from a distanced perspec-
tive. Heidegger argues that positivist science intends to understand the world
from the present-to-hand stance, attempting to engage with it as an objective
observer, set apart from the things being studied. Readiness-to-hand is the kind
of quality that equipment possesses, which means we know about equipment
only if we use it.
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The notion of readiness-to-hand is just as appropriate and more relevant to
action researchers, when the thing being used is of a nonmaterial nature. For
example, influence as a concept can be understood only in a limited capacity by
considering it cognitively. To understand the nature of influence, one must be
in its realm either as an influencer or as the one being influenced (Ladkin,
2005).
Although most researchers who lean toward positivism have been trying to
be as objective as possible, action researchers are encouraged to embrace their
subjectivity as the base from which they inquire, but this does not necessitate
dismissing any idea of objectivity. The challenge is how to conceptualize and
act on the interrelationship between subjectivity and objectivity in developing
our own meanings and truths.
One question that often arises for action researchers, especially in the first-
person dimension of inquiries, is that of how they might avoid being self-indul-
gent or solipsistic in their inquiries. This seems to speak of a concern for
achieving balance between articulating and honoring the subjective influences
that affect an inquiry and the desire to create knowledge or foster understand-
ing that will have meaning and applicability to others, knowledge that is
acceptable and persuasive, in other words, speaking of a truth to convey a
similar meaning to what the researcher has in the mind.
Truth: Philosophical Schools
Human efforts to find the truth have a long history, and in every field of study
there have been debates about ways and possibilities of discovering it. The
concern of positivists has been to become detached from self, have a neutral
look toward research, and consequently avoid the bias; however, because they
have not been able to meet such a goal, positivism and the questions it has been
proposing about truth inquiry, particularly in terms of the possibility of the
objectivity it offers, have lost their historical dominance. But similar questions
about truth inquiries persist, questions like: Is the discovery of truth ever
possible, or is the desire for it an artifact of post-enlightenment thinking? What
is the nature of truth that is revealed through subjective ways of knowing, and
how can it be of value and use to anyone other than the subjective knower?
What is the relationship between subjectively oriented meaning and any objec-
tively valid truth? And finally, how can we distinguish between our own
desires, interpretations, perspectives, and any truths the inquiry may reveal? Is
this a valid pursuit?
In our postmodern context, most people speak about truths rather than
truth, and the emergent nature of such truths has gradually been accepted. In
terms of action research, such a belief in multiple truths is more defensible
because an action research report explains events in a particular context. It
seeks an account of a specific situation that comes sufficiently close to its
underlying structure. Therefore, the value of the work depends in part on how
it changes the situation for the better and eventually how far others find the
report persuasive. Therefore, a clear conception of what makes an action re-
search report more persuasive, rather than less so, is certainly a matter of truth
that is worth further exploration (Winter, 2002).
The level of persuasiveness depends on how close outcomes of research are
to truth, although truth itself is veiled in a variety of dimensions, and the action
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researcher does not always get back what is expected as a result of the action
applied to the situation. Winter (2002) explains how truth might be hidden.
According to him, given the “chaotic” complexity of the feedback loops in
social affairs, some of the consequences of action will be other than those
anticipated, so that rationales for decision-making are likely to contain
delusion and miscalculations. Besides, some of the effective motives for in-
dividual action are hidden in the unconscious parts of the psyche and are thus
determined by past and forgotten events, either in the early life of the in-
dividual or in prehistoric patterns of meaning. Moreover, some of the mean-
ings of our actions are structured by hegemonic ideologies, which
systematically distort the meanings of action in the political interests of the
powerful and against the interests of the culturally oppressed, but also sys-
tematically conceal that this is the case. In addition to this, the fundamental
disjuncture between perceiving phenomena in sense experience and under-
standing their real meaning is a basic tenet of any philosophical system that
does not begin from an empiricist reduction.
These hidden dimensions have been treated variably by philosophical
schools, and each explores truth from a different perspective. Healy and Perry
(2000) explicate on judging validity in the realism paradigm that relies on
multiple perceptions about a single reality. They argue for the involvement of
triangulation of several data sources and their interpretations with those
multiple perceptions in the realism paradigm (Golafshani, 2003). In this regard
action researchers do not have to present the truth to justify their findings. In
this school all researchers need to do is to look for multiple sources of data and
apply triangulation techniques to interpret and understand what the text
means.
Like realists, naturalist inquirers make virtually the opposite assumptions
to positivistic scientific inquirers. They focus on the multiple realities that like
the layers of an onion nest within or complement one another. Each layer
provides a separate perspective of reality, and none can be considered more
true than any other. Phenomena do not “converge into a single form” (Guba &
Lincoln, 1981, p. 57), a single truth, but diverge into many forms, multiple
truths.
From the coherence theory of truth perspective, research results consist of a
set of coherent beliefs. The coherence theory of truth presents truth and the
tests for truth as applying more to a set of beliefs and the relationship between
them than to a single proposition in isolation. In the simplest terms, one’s
beliefs are true insofar as they are internally consistent and coherent (i.e., not
only do they avoid self-contradiction, but they are mutually implicative and
supportive) and comprehensive (i.e., the more extensive their scope and
elucidatory capacity—while retaining coherence—the stronger the confidence
they invite, Bridges, 1999).
Coherence in the ideal sense may be defined as the relationship holding
between a body of propositions such that none of them can be false if all the rest
are true, and that none of them is independent of the others. That is, between
all the several propositions exists a mutual entailment such that any of them is
deducible from all the rest, and none of them could be true if any of the others
were false.
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At any given time the degree of truth in research results is the degree of
system it has achieved. The degree of truth of a particular result is to be judged
in the first instance by its coherence with other research results, all comprehen-
sive and fully articulated, in which thought can come to rest (Blanshard, 1939).
Action research seems not to be able to fit within the coherence theory of truth
because, as stated above, the results that come out of action research are mostly
context-bound, and two characteristics of this theory of truth (internal consis-
tency and coherence and comprehensiveness) do not apply to an action re-
search framework.
The coherence theory of truth appears to suggest that we cannot really
determine the truth of any belief until we have developed an entire and wholly
inclusive system of beliefs. Also, it is not clear how in a coherence theory of
truth one could decide between two sets of beliefs that were both internally
coherent, but that were nevertheless mutually incompatible; or perhaps it is
supposed that ultimately only one such set of beliefs can stand—that one
system only is true, namely, the system in which everything real and possible
is coherently included—in which case the theory seems to be invoking a
principle additional to that of coherence, namely, that of comprehensiveness or
universality. Besides, the theory appears to rely on a truth presupposed inde-
pendently of the theory itself: the truth of some of the basic laws of logic that
themselves underpin the notion of coherence (Bridges, 1999).
Correspondence theorists look for indicators to check truth. In the framework
of the correspondence theory of truth, action research embraces both a notion
of what it means for a proposition to be true and an indication of how one
might check whether a proposition is true. Essentially, on this account a
proposition is true if and only if it corresponds with a currently existing fact.
However, as an ideal, correspondence between the world and the action re-
searcher refers not only to what the inquirer perceives and understands, but to
what he or she has to say about the world. In other words, “correspondence is
to occur not only in perception and understanding but in representation as
well” (Eisner, 1992, p. 10).
This philosophy of thought has shortcomings in looking for truth. The word
correspondence suggests that when, for example, action researchers make a true
judgment, they have a sort of picture of the real in the mind and the judgment
is true because this picture is like the reality it represents. But the judgment is
not like the physical things to which it refers. The images researchers use in
judging may indeed in certain respects “copy or resemble physical things,” but
researchers can make a judgment without using any imagery except words,
and words are not at all similar to the things that they represent. Researchers
must not “understand correspondence as meaning copying or even
resemblance” (Ewing, 1951, pp. 54-55).
A second difficulty about the correspondence theory of truth is that it comes
close to circularity. A proposition is true if it corresponds to a fact, but what is
a fact? Is it not a state of affairs represented by a true proposition? So how
informative is the correspondence theory? All so-called perception or observa-
tion is not simply the camera eye recording the given; it is also the mind
interpreting according to the pattern of one’s past experience; and exactly what
you will see will depend on what your interests are, either in general or in this
special case. The correspondence model of truth relies in the end on a circular
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dispute, because we have no means of establishing the facts other than through
our investigations and our accounts of those investigations. Correspondence is
thus a claim rather than an objective criterion for judgment (Winter, 2002).
Consensus theory is based on a philosophy that appreciates group thoughts
and an agreement among people. Consensus theory draws on some of the
constructivist thinking that underpins philosophical pragmatism, but effec-
tively turns the truth or falsity of a belief into a matter of social agreement. For
example, some contexts lend themselves more readily to consensus theory than
others. So philosophers have tended to be skeptical of consensus theory as an
account of what it means for a belief to be true. Perhaps researchers ought to
share especially in this skepticism of consensus, because it is arguably their
particular function as intellectual citizens to challenge the easy and self-per-
petuating consensus that society creates for itself (Roszak, 1968). At least they
have to observe that what any group of people believes or agrees to be true
may rest on, for example, unexamined tradition, the hegemony of a dominant
class, the suppression or self-censorship of dissenting opinion, or collective
hysteria: everything that intellectuals and researchers have traditionally been
expected to subvert.
However, consensus theory has come to occupy an important place, par-
ticularly in action research and evaluation, that is dominated by the language
of, for example, triangulation (one form of which might involve establishing
consensus between varied observers or stakeholders) and the negotiation of an
agreed position in relation either to events themselves or some published
account of those events.
Another paradigm that can be useful for action researchers is construc-
tivism, which views knowledge as socially constructed and changeable
depending on the circumstances. From social perspectives, constructivism is
defined as “the view that all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as
such, is contingent on human practices, being constructed in and out of interac-
tion between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted
within an essentially social context” (Golafshani, 2003, p. 603). The construc-
tivist notion, that reality is changing whether the observer wishes it or not, is an
indication of multiple or possibly diverse constructions of reality. Therefore, to
acquire valid, multiple, and diverse realities, multiple methods of searching or
gathering data are in order.
Pragmatism is a philosophy that can be a leading theoretical foundation for
action research. It can fit between quantitative and qualitative research philos-
ophies. According to pragmatism, truth is what works. It allows the researcher
to pursue his or her interests in practice (Bridges, 1999). Pragmatic theory
serves most comfortably in the world in which it is dealing with things work-
ing. Much of what we do may well be governed by projects and belief systems
in which the pragmatic principle serves us well. It is less readily applied,
although some have attempted its application, to areas like religion, morality,
mathematics, or even less applied areas of science.
However, the proper way to conceive of the relationship between truth and
functionality is not that a belief is true if it works, but a belief will work if it is
true. Bridges (1999) argues against pragmatism, saying that it begs some of the
most important questions. A decision as to whether some belief in the context
of classrooms, for example, works or not “presupposes some view of what
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would count as working” (p. 605). In this context, this might involve some
judgment about educational aims and procedural principles that cannot them-
selves be determined by reference to whether they work, because they provide
the criteria used to determine whether some particular belief is working.
However, pragmatic theory is clearly represented in the world of classroom
action research. For example, classroom action research is posited firmly on the
conviction that educational principles have no validity until they have been
tested in action, and further, that such principles are best derived from the
results of practice in the classroom.
Although these philosophical schools look for truth in varying ways and try
to lead research studies to find valid results, some researchers categorize
validity and define criteria to determine how valid research findings are.
Validity: Controversial Issues
Norris (1997) believes that validity refers to the reasons we have for believing
truth claims, what Dewey called “warranted assertibility” (Norris, p. 172).
According to Turnock and Gibson (2001), validity in action research is not
about methodology, but about personal and interpersonal issues. They do not
wish to reject methodological theory. Instead, they feel that insights acquired in
solving issues of validity help inform action research methodology.
In action research the issue of validity is not concerned with instrument
construction, because as Patton (2002) observes, “the researcher is the instru-
ment” (p. 14). It is how theory is situated in an actual setting, and as Maxwell
(1992) suggests, it is at least in part an attempt to uncover theory-in-use.
Although there are many controversial ideas about validity, all show re-
searchers’ concerns for the need to justify research results. Broadly defined,
validity can fall into the following categories.
Descriptive validity. This refers to the factual accuracy of the account as
reported by the researchers (Simco & Warin, 1997). The key questions ad-
dressed in descriptive validity are: Did what was reported as taking place
actually happen? Does the report reflect exactly what the researchers saw and
heard? In other words, descriptive validity refers to accuracy in reporting
descriptive information. This form of validity is important because description
is a major objective in nearly all qualitative research.
Interpretive validity. This requires developing a window into the minds of
the people being studied. Interpretive validity refers to portraying accurately
the meaning attached by participants to what is being studied by the re-
searcher. More specifically, it refers to the degree to which the research
participants’ viewpoints, thoughts, feelings, intentions, and experiences are
accurately understood by the qualitative researcher and portrayed in the re-
search report (Johnson, 1997). Accurate interpretive validity requires that the
researcher look through the participants’ eyes and see and feel what they see
and feel. Thus the qualitative researcher can understand things from the
participants’ perspectives and provide a valid account of these perspectives.
Theoretical validity. This refers to the logical bearing of a study on the devel-
opment of a theory (Sells, Smith, & Newfield, 1997). Theoretical validity exists
to the degree that a theoretical explanation developed from a research study
fits the data and, therefore, is credible and defensible. Theory usually refers to
discussions of how a phenomenon operates and why it operates as it does.
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Theory is usually more abstract and less concrete than description and inter-
pretation. Theory development moves beyond the facts and provides an ex-
planation of the phenomenon.
Validity Criteria
Quoting Guba and Lincoln (Anderson & Herr, 1999), who stated, “relevance
without rigor is no better than rigor without relevance,” Anderson and Herr
argue that action research will continue to be marginalized unless rigorous
validity criteria are agreed. However, they state,
Action research should not be judged by the same validity criteria with which
we judge “positivistic” and naturalistic research. This is not to say that there is
no overlap or that it is less rigorous, but that a new definition of rigor is
required that does not mislead or marginalize practitioner researcher. As
action research is disseminated beyond local sites, there is a need to deepen
conversations about these issues. (p. 15)
James and Worrall (2000) propose the following criteria for what is con-
sidered research for action researchers.
Outcome validity. This views the extent to which the action resolves the
problem being studied. However, rather than simply asking whether problems
have been solved, this should acknowledge that action research often has a
spiraling dynamic that forces the researcher to reframe the problem.
Process validity. Altrichter (1991) believes that process validity refers to the
whole research process that tests the quality of research in two ways: critique
and practice.
Via critique the logical soundness, the way categories were developed, the
compatibility with accepted standards in theory and in accepted empirical
findings, and so forth is checked. Via practice (as replication in research or
social practice) the empirical consequences postulated by a theory are tested
against a variety of standards as efficiency, side-effects, ethics, etc. (p. 84)
This type of validity determines whether the process is aligned with desired
outcomes and refers to the extent to which problems are framed and solved in
a manner that permits the ongoing learning of the individual or system. The
emphasis on process begs questions about the kind of evidence that might
sustain assertions. Insofar as the methods of naturalistic inquiry are relevant,
notions of respondent validation, triangulation, and the inclusion of multiple
perspectives can be brought to bear.
Democratic validity. This takes into account collaborative processes and
multiple perspectives in the research. In fact it refers to the extent to which
research is done in cooperation with all the parties who have a stake in the
problem under investigation (including students and parents). The issue here
is one of ethics and social justice; solutions to problems need to be examined to
see whether benefits to one group are introduced at the expense of other
stakeholders. Although empirical evidence may be called on in this kind of
validation, deliberation of a more philosophical kind is likely to be equally
important.
Catalytic validity. This determines the extent to which the action focuses
participants toward a greater understanding of active knowledge. In other
words, it looks for the degree to which the research process reorientates,
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focuses, and energizes participants toward knowing reality in order to trans-
form it. The concept is derived from Lather (1986) and emphasizes the transfor-
mative potential for all involved, including the action researchers themselves,
who should expect to deepen their own understanding.
Dialogic validity. This is a review of the research by the participants through
collaborative processes and refers to the extent to which action researchers seek
dialogue with peers in order to engage with others about the quality of their
research. This resonates with the concept of peer review in academic research
and emphasizes the need for action research to be open to rigorous critique if it
is to be valued. There seems no consensus, however, on whether critical and
reflective dialogue should extend beyond the “critical friend” or the “com-
munity of collaborative inquirers” to other research communities. My own
view is that it must if action research is to warrant the research title, but it means
finding a language and register for communication that other communities will
understand. Addressing issues of validity directly may help because criticisms
of practitioner research often come down to this.
Conclusion
Proponents of action research emphasize that the uniqueness of each project
means that each report must suggest its own criteria for judgment or that the
value of the work resides in the practice improvements or enhanced group
morale it engenders in the particular context during the time span of the project
(Lomax, 1994). They believe that validity-enhancing practices do not ensure
that research is accurate, correct, certain, trustworthy, objective, or any of the
other surrogates we use for truth. There are no guarantees, no bedrock from
which verities can be derived. It is in the nature of research that knowledge can
always be revised. In the words of Lather (1993), validity is “multiple, partial,
endlessly deferred” (p. 675).
Looking at these debates more rigorously and aiming at the objectivity of
our own, as action researchers we must fully take on the implications of our
subjectivity, being in a real sense the foundation for our knowing and claims to
truth. Rigor could be constituted by the extent to which we can also account for
our located perspective, that is, to the extent that we can simultaneously
consider our subjectivity from a distance (or objectively). Truths based in
objectivity-for-subjectivity are necessarily emergent, located, and to that extent
limited. They are also completely and necessarily intertwined with meaning
(Ladkin, 2005). And finally, as Chandler and Torber (2003) express, instead of
considering action research as a research method without validity, it is time to
explore how quantitative objectivity and qualitative subjectivity can be inter-
woven into action research settings to complement one another.
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